• Collective Responsibility for Oppression

    Author(s):
    Titus Stahl (see profile)
    Date:
    2017
    Group(s):
    Philosophy
    Subject(s):
    Political science--Philosophy
    Item Type:
    Article
    Tag(s):
    Oppression, collective responsibility, Political philosophy
    Permanent URL:
    http://dx.doi.org/10.17613/M6P77D
    Abstract:
    Many contemporary forms of oppression are not primarily the result of formally organized collective action nor are they an unintended outcome of a combination of individual actions. This raises the question of collective responsibility. I argue that we can only determine who is responsible for oppression if we understand oppression as a matter of social practices that create obstacles for social change. This social practice view of oppression enables two insights: First, that there is an unproblematic sense in which groups can bear irreducible collective responsibility for oppression. Second, that there are derived forms of individual responsibility for members of dominant groups.
    Metadata:
    xml
    Published as:
    Journal article     Show details
    Pub. DOI:
    10.5840/soctheorpract201773110
    Publisher:
    Philosophy Documentation Center
    Pub. Date:
    2017-8-3
    Journal:
    Social Theory and Practice
    Volume:
    43
    Issue:
    3
    Page Range:
    473 - 501
    ISSN:
    0037-802X
    Status:
    Published
    Last Updated:
    6 years ago
    License:
    All Rights Reserved

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