• Street on evolution and the normativity of epistemic reasons

    Author(s):
    Daan Evers (see profile)
    Date:
    2015
    Group(s):
    Philosophy
    Subject(s):
    Ethics
    Item Type:
    Article
    Tag(s):
    epistemic reasons, epistemology, evolutionary debunking, moral realism, sharon street, Epistemology, Evolution
    Permanent URL:
    http://dx.doi.org/10.17613/M6DP8S
    Abstract:
    Sharon Street (2009) argues that realism about epistemic normativity is false. Realists believe there are truths about epistemic reasons that hold independently of the agent's (or anyone else's) attitudes. Street argues by dilemma. Either the realist accepts a certain account of the nature of belief, or she does not. If she does, then she cannot consistently accept realism. If she does not, then she has no scientifically credible explanation of the fact that our epistemic behaviours or beliefs about epistemic reasons align with independent normative truths. I argue that neither horn is very sharp for realists about epistemic normativity.
    Metadata:
    xml
    Published as:
    Journal article     Show details
    Pub. DOI:
    DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0714-4
    Publisher:
    Springer Nature
    Pub. Date:
    2015-3-23
    Journal:
    Synthese
    Volume:
    192
    Issue:
    11
    Page Range:
    3663 - 3676
    ISSN:
    0039-7857,1573-0964
    Status:
    Published
    Last Updated:
    7 years ago
    License:
    All Rights Reserved

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