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Street on evolution and the normativity of epistemic reasons
- Author(s):
- Daan Evers (see profile)
- Date:
- 2015
- Group(s):
- Philosophy
- Subject(s):
- Ethics
- Item Type:
- Article
- Tag(s):
- epistemic reasons, epistemology, evolutionary debunking, moral realism, sharon street, Epistemology, Evolution
- Permanent URL:
- http://dx.doi.org/10.17613/M6DP8S
- Abstract:
- Sharon Street (2009) argues that realism about epistemic normativity is false. Realists believe there are truths about epistemic reasons that hold independently of the agent's (or anyone else's) attitudes. Street argues by dilemma. Either the realist accepts a certain account of the nature of belief, or she does not. If she does, then she cannot consistently accept realism. If she does not, then she has no scientifically credible explanation of the fact that our epistemic behaviours or beliefs about epistemic reasons align with independent normative truths. I argue that neither horn is very sharp for realists about epistemic normativity.
- Metadata:
- xml
- Published as:
- Journal article Show details
- Pub. DOI:
- DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0714-4
- Publisher:
- Springer Nature
- Pub. Date:
- 2015-3-23
- Journal:
- Synthese
- Volume:
- 192
- Issue:
- 11
- Page Range:
- 3663 - 3676
- ISSN:
- 0039-7857,1573-0964
- Status:
- Published
- Last Updated:
- 7 years ago
- License:
- All Rights Reserved
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